The G20 Summit, to be hosted in Bali between the 15th and 16th of November this year, is fast approaching. The G20 provides ample opportunity for Indonesia as a host country to gain international prestige and domestic political wins. Equally, however, there are a number of obstacles the country will face that may inhibit its ability to make the most of such opportunities. This article looks at both the opportunities and obstacles to appraise whether Indonesia will meet its goals when the Summit rolls around this coming November.

What is the G20? 

The Group of 20 (G20) is an informal forum for international cooperation on global economic and financial issues. The G20 brings together leaders from the European Union and the following 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Together, these countries represent approximately 90% of global GDP, 80% of international trade and two thirds of the world’s population. 

Originating from a meeting between 20 finance ministers and central bank governors at Washington DC in 1999, the G20 evolved into a leader-level forum in 2008 to respond to the Global Financial Crisis. Since then, G20 Leaders Summits have occurred on an annual basis with a rotating presidency amongst its members. The President of the G20 each year is responsible for hosting the Summit, and has the power to decide the agenda and invite guests. This year, the President of the G20 is Indonesia. 

Indonesia’s Presidency of the G20

As President of the G20 in 2022 and Chair of the Group of 33 developing countries in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Indonesia has committed to representing the voices of developing countries at the negotiating table. It has chosen to focus on ‘Recover Together, Recover Stronger’ as the theme of the Summit held in Bali, to highlight the issue of an equitable and sustainable post-pandemic recovery. As part of this theme, Indonesia has also chosen to focus on three priority issues: global health architecture, digital transformation and sustainable energy transition.

At an international level, Indonesia’s Presidency of the G20 is significant for the country as it represents a chance for the nation to gain international prestige. Whereas commentators note that President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has taken ‘a more passive approach to multilateralism’ compared to his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jokowi is looking to step up Indonesia’s global leadership as his presidential term winds to a close in 2024. While advocacy on behalf of the interests of developing countries is one way Jokowi has sought to make a global mark, the intensifying great power rivalry in the lead up to the Summit has meant that Jokowi has attempted to play the role of a ‘bridge builder, particularly between Russia and Ukraine’. Jokowi is also seeking to highlight Indonesia’s position as a prominent leader within the ASEAN bloc by vocalising regional security issues, particularly the political situation in Myanmar and Chinese incursions into the South China Sea. 

As a pragmatist, Presidency of the G20 is also important for Jokowi as the Summit represents an opportunity to gain domestic political wins. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has openly stated that it wishes to showcase Indonesia’s investment potential by hosting the G20 and that it is a chance for the country to demonstrate to the world that it is ‘open for business’. Minister of Investment Bahlil Lahadalia has said that he aims to attract Rp 200 to 250 trillion (USD 13.4 to 16.8 billion) in foreign direct investment over the course of the G20 Presidency. Apart from that, the government seems keen to use the momentum of the G20 to drive home difficult domestic political reforms, such as plans to implement a carbon tax and pass the Personal Data Protection Bill that has been stuck in a legislative nether. 

Potential Challenges

With all these ambitions comes the crucial question – how likely is Indonesia and Jokowi to achieve its goals at the G20 Summit? Certainly there are obstacles lying ahead.

Geopolitical Tensions

Geopolitical tensions exacerbated by the war in Ukraine leaves Indonesia’s leadership in a precarious position. Firstly, there is the question of whether all the major political players will even attend. Russia’s invitation and attendance at past G20 meetings this year has led to walkouts by US, Canadian, and British officials. Both US President Joe Biden and Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland have called for Russia’s removal from the forum, referencing the harsh economic impacts of Russia’s illegal invasion, claiming ‘business as usual’ at the G20 an impossibility. Indonesia has responded by inviting Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky as a guest to the summit. Jokowi has travelled to both Ukraine and Russia to attempt mediation in his capacity as a G20 president, publicly indicated his ‘readiness to be a communication bridge between the two leaders’, and announced that he had secured Russian guarantees to permit vital exports of food and fertilizer from Ukraine.  

Intense political divisions within the forum have already culminated in significant setbacks, with an unprecedented failure at the meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to produce a joint communique resulting in having to instead publish a 14-paragraph ‘Chair’s Summary’. Indonesian Finance Minister Mulyani Indrawati commented that the failure to produce the traditional communique was a ‘challenging and difficult situation…most of the paragraphs are actually supported by our members but there is still an issue that they cannot reconcile yet…because they want to express their views related to the war’.

Fragile Economy

The Ukraine war has impaired an already fragile global economy, with supply chain disruptions and commodity price shocks worsening a cost-of-living crisis affecting millions of people. An additional 71 million were pushed into extreme poverty in the world’s biggest countries according to the UNDP. This is against the backdrop of a still in-progress global recovery from continual Covid-19 related disruptions.

Global inflation is on the rise and higher than last year’s 2021 World Economic Outlook Update projections due to food and energy prices and lingering supply-demand imbalances. This has led to an increased risk of recession and further monetary tightening by major central banks that will weigh on post-Covid economic recovery. There are no signs of improvement in the foreseeable future, with recent indicators by the IMF projecting a further decrease in global growth for both 2022 and 2023. Economic hardship and threats to food security remain a global issue, and are lamented as a ‘long-standing headache for Jakarta’, one of the largest countries facing severe ‘double burdens’ of malnutrition – undernutrition and obesity. Indonesia’s low levels of economic engagement with other G20 countries could also undermine its ability to act as a strong negotiator in the area of global trade. While Jokowi aims to increase trade between Indonesia and other G20 partners (perhaps through the forum itself), Indonesia is not quite there yet.

Ahead of the November Summit, the IMF has outlined three major priorities for the G20 in addressing such a challenging, complex, and ever-changing global economic climate. Firstly, countries must do everything in their power to bring down high inflation. Secondly, fiscal policy must help-and not hinder- central bank efforts to bring down inflation. Thirdly, there is a need for a fresh impetus for global cooperation – led by the G20 – and the G20’s new $1.1 billion fund for pandemic preservation and preparedness show that this is possible. There is opportunity here for Indonesia in its position as G20 leader to reduce barriers to cooperative and open trade, however it is clear that it faces a challenging economic environment, and it remains to be seen how much progress can be made at the forum under its leadership.  

Renewable Energy

Sustainable energy transition is one of three key priority areas for Indonesia’s G20 theme of ‘Recover together, Recover stronger’. With the third largest tropical rainforest in the world, the largest topical peatlands and mangrove forests, and numerous coastal zones, the impacts of climate change are of great import to Indonesia’s long-term development and living conditions for many Indonesians.

How a sustainable energy transition should be managed, however, currently divides members of the G20, with a significant emissions gap between advanced economies and developing economies within the forum itself. Noto Suoneto and Hugh Harsono for The Diplomat compellingly argue that ‘Indonesia must address the challenge lying in the fact that not all G20 economies possess the same economies, knowledge, and societal demands regarding the issue of energy transition.’

Domestically, Indonesia’s energy transition policy remains slightly confused. On the one hand, Indonesia has initiated various projects aimed specifically at establishing renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and hydropower. On the other, it has an economic dependence on coal for its economic growth, and is the world’s 8^th largest carbon emitter. Indonesia generates a very low amount of renewable energy compared to other G20 nations, which could ‘potentially affect its credibility to lead the G20 on this issue.’

Domestic Lobby Groups

Adding further to existing strains on the G20’s various precedential meetings to the G20’s main November Summit are the protests and concerns of domestic Indigenous and Women’s Rights groups. The G20’s official dialogue for women’s empowerment, known as Women 20 or the W20 (held between 19-21 July) has been the subject of protests due to alleged exclusion of local voices and failures to address key women’s issues. Activists at Lake Toba, North Sumatra claimed that issues of deforestation, land grabbing and agrarian conflict in the area, which disproportionately affects Indigenous women, have been overlooked.

Sekar Bankaran Aji, a campaigner for Greenpeace Indonesia, spoke to Al Jazeera on the issue:

‘I think the W20 narrative is ironic when their theme is ‘recover together’ equally, but they didn’t even include any agenda regarding land grabbing and customary forests. Toba women are not involved in the talks in an inclusive manner, so how can they recover together equally? The forum focused on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), while women are dying trying to defend their customary land, something which is apparently not considered a problem for the W20.’

This follows Joko Widodo’s signing of four Presidential Decrees intended to protect land for farmers around Lake Toba, however local groups say they do not go far enough to protect land rights. They call for the revocation of permits of companies that negatively affect women, farmers and Indigenous peoples. Certainly domestic issues remain at the forefront of Indonesia’s leadership of the G20.

Conclusion

It’s not all doom and gloom. In fact, Indonesia has already managed some significant achievements that bode well for the November Summit. Despite the failure to publish a joint communique, Indonesia still managed to secure attendance from all G20 members at both the Foreign Ministers Meeting and Finance Ministers Meeting. Indrawati maintained that there were multiple areas in which consensus was reached, including the importance of stabilizing food security, preparing a pandemic response and prevention, creating a global tax agreement, price stability, and assisting in financing cleaner energy globally. Progress in these areas aligns well with Indonesia’s G20 theme and priority issues.

In a turn-around from Scott Morrison’s stance and a win for Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has confirmed Australia’s attendance at the November Summit, and has offered assistance to Indonesia as host. On August 18^th, Jokowi publicly announced that Xi Jinping and President Putin have both confirmed their attendance, and that Ukraine and Russia have accepted Indonesia as a ‘bridge of peace.’

Indonesia’s priority areas and agenda to raise both economic growth and its international profile can still become reality, despite the geo-political, economic, energy, and domestic challenges it faces. As G20 President in a unique crisis it has played its peace-maker role well. Many opportunities remain to collaborate with other non-aligned leaders in the forum such as South Africa, Brazil, and Australia and next year’s G20 Chair India on creating achievable targets that take into account the need for pragmatism and facilitation. The IMF has offered ongoing advice for Indonesia’s leadership and key priorities for the November Summit, and addressing these priorities concurrently acts to mollify domestic issues such as economic hardship and threats to food security.

With vast renewable energy sources and many more projects currently underway, including an expected move of Indonesia’s capital to East Kalimantan and a potential subsequent development of the Balikpapan shipping port into a ‘green bunkering hub for domestic shipping’, Indonesia is on the right path to become a strong authority on climate issues at the G20. However, it should learn from the W20 and take care to include the perspectives of Indigenous communities and women in its planning. Lessons from the G20’s various forums can also be utilized as learnings for Indonesia’s 2023 chairmanship of ASEAN.

Finally, an apt summation by Endy Bayuni of The Jakarta Post:‘Indonesia has done all the right things in keeping the G20 relevant during the first eight months of its presidency, still keeping the economic agenda and its theme Recover Together, Recover Strong intact as far as possible but shifting the priority and allocating more resources toward the larger and more important agenda: Peace.’

Written by Hirzi Putra Laksana and Kate Langley.

With Indonesia as one of Australia’s closest neighbours, the two countries share large expat populations – students, foreign national workers and permanent residency holders among other groups. This article is the second (check out the first here) in a two-part series by AIYA National exploring the experiences of Indonesian youth in Australia and Australian youth in Indonesia during the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the time of part one’s writing in October 2021, the spread of COVID-19’s deadly Delta strain seemed to be slowing down, with what seemed to be a gradual return to normalcy and stability worldwide. Now, with the emergence of the highly contagious Omicron strain, it is timely to examine the experiences of Australian youth living in Indonesia, including accessing vaccines and support, and the difficulties they have faced during the pandemic.

This article is based on interviews with five Australian youth currently residing in Indonesia, for reasons as diverse as international study, temporary relocation, employment and permanent residency alongside an Indonesian spouse.

The perspectives in this series bring to light how universal so many aspects of youth experiences have been with COVID-19 regardless of geographical location, but also the complexities in how youth have interpreted, reacted and reflected on their unique personal journeys during the pandemic.

Hope of Coming Home

While there were many similarities between the experiences and emotions of Indonesian youth in Australia and Australian youth in Indonesia during the last two pandemic years, we found key differences in reasons for staying.

Part one of this series looked at Indonesian youth living in Australia during the pandemic. We found that the interviewees were primarily international students, and largely chose to stay in Australia for fear of being unable to re-enter due to a strict travel ban in effect at the time.

For Australian youth in Indonesia, the decision to stay was not always their own to make, and while the people we spoke to almost universally had wanted to return to Australia, they were unable to do so for a multitude of reasons.

Sophie*, a 25-year old from East Jakarta, told us that her and her family were not able to return to Australia despite an “almost constant” wish to do so due to the expense of flights and mandatory hotel quarantine. Amin and Hannah, young Australians residing in Jakarta and Yogyakarta respectively, wanted to return to Australia at the start of the pandemic. These costs, however, along with Australia’s arrival quotas and the length of quarantine, have been unaffordable, particularly for a younger demographic.

Another factor limiting the ability for Australian youth to return to Australia is the presence of family in both Indonesia and Australia. “I have heard of a lot of mixed nationality families having difficulties getting visas and having familial responsibilities in both countries makes returning difficult” said Sophie.

Both Sophie and Hannah have Indonesian spouses, and with Sophie being a recent mother the decision to stay in Indonesia to support their spouses came at the cost of in-person support and an absence of family visits.   

All our interviewees used social media platforms such as Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and Skype to stay connected to family and friends back in Australia, however Samuel, a 28-year old residing in Jakarta, pointed out that “online communication is not the same as seeing people in person in terms of social support”.

With Omicron cases rising rapidly globally and numerous industries crippled, two of our interviewees noted that uncertain employment back in Australia made returning impossible. “We are hesitant for my husband to leave his stable job without knowing if/when he will be able to find employment in Australia”, said Hannah. 

Some respondents said they had obtained steady employment in Indonesia. “I’m lucky as I’ve had a regular income in Indonesia, but there was a lot of uncertainty if I were to return to Australia on being able to obtain employment particularly in 2020 with the harsh lockdowns” said Samuel, who works full-time in Jakarta. Others had managed to continue running a successful small business, focusing on translating work and operating out of their homes. 

On the 1^st November 2021 Australian border restrictions were eased to allow fully vaccinated Australian citizens, permanent residents and immediate family to enter without an exemption or mandatory hotel quarantine. On the 21st of February 2022, national border restrictions were further eased to allow all international visitors. While these developments may enable many Australian youth living overseas to return home, there clearly still remains many financial, logistical and familial challenges.

A Road of Restrictions

With these numerous barriers preventing many young Australians from returning to Australia, our interviewees had to navigate in-country challenges during the pandemic in Indonesia.

For many, a key issue was gaining access to the Indonesian vaccination program that was rolled out for citizens from January 2021. Samuel said “I had a lot of trouble finding out how to get a vaccine, with little information given on the Australian Consulate website”. He noted that it appeared the Indonesian government struggled with coordinating the vaccination program, which was disappointing for a lot of non-citizen residents.

Similarly, Hannah explained that even with a permanent residency and her marriage to an Indonesian citizen, the initial vaccine roll-out “did prioritise Indonesian citizens, meaning permanent resident visa holders and other mixed-marriage families did face challenges with regards to regulations affecting them directly”. She noted that there was a “large variance in approach and timing in rolling-out vaccines in Jakarta versus the other provinces”, with a lack of national coordination.

By August 2021, Australia was plagued by a ‘second deadly wave’ of COVID-19 peaking 700 cases a day stemming from infectious leaks from hotel quarantine in Melbourne and Sydney. For Amin this meant that despite having booked flights back to Australia, the tightening of border restrictions as a response to the second wave resulted in their cancellation – he was “extremely disheartened at not being able to come back home and simply watch the crisis unfold from afar”.

While Indonesia didn’t enact lockdowns as an official response strategy to the same extent as the Australian government, our interviewees said that Indonesian residents were in “a kind of self-imposed lockdown on and off”, said Hannah. Sophie mentioned that Indonesia’s lockdowns were “never as severe or well enforced as Australia’s”, however her family chose to shelter in place for their own welfare for many months.

For Hannah and Sophie the closure of schools and childcare centres from March 2020 also meant becoming “isolated as sole carers, with very little social interaction”, and “having to home-school with almost no official support”. Hannah also identified that with the switch to working from home, staff have been expected to “be available and ready to work at all hours of the day, every day of the week, even late evenings and weekends, without any holidays”, which has really impacted quality of life and mental health.

Ultimately, access to vaccinations appeared to be a point of confusion and difficulty for all. Australia’s second wave meant yet another hurdle in returning for our interviewees. Closures of schools and child care centres for over 18 months combined with a working-from-home mandate meant excessive responsibility was placed on our respondents with families.

Bouncing Back Better

Our interviewees had a few suggestions for how they could have been better supported by both the Indonesian and Australian government during the pandemic. These suggestions are particularly timely as Indonesia, like the rest of the world, faces a rise in Omicron cases at the time of writing.

Sophie suggested that both Indonesia and Australia “need a better and more reliable quarantine system, as inner-city high-rise hotels with poor ventilation are ineffective”. At the time of writing, Indonesia still requires a 7-day hotel quarantine upon arrival if travelling internationally. In Australia, quarantine requirements vary by state and territory, with many still requiring a period of isolation in hotel quarantine.

Amin suggested that the health system and infrastructure in Indonesia should’ve been strengthened before the arrival of Omicron, with more proactive action taken. Sophie pointed out that it was “extremely stressful here during the deadly Delta wave mid-2021 when the health system collapsed. We didn’t really leave the house for several months except for my husband to buy groceries”.

It has seemed like Government-run financial aid projects have had immense implementation troubles, alongside difficulties coordinating the vaccination program and not enough information provided for Australians by the Consulate, Samuel and Hannah noted. While there have been Australian Government loans available for overseas Australians for emergency living costs and flights these are only available as a last resort and have a strict eligibility criteria according to the Smarttraveller website. This has meant they are accessible for very few. 

“I understand the logistical difficulties that both countries face in trying to handle the pandemic…” said Hannah, “…I think that the government and companies need to make more effective work from home policies to protect the rights of their workers.” Sophie also noted the difficulty for the Indonesian government in implementing effective national policies due to diverse social, religious and economic groups in Indonesia.

Our respondents understood that there were immense difficulties the Indonesian government faced, and none said that the pandemic had changed their perceptions of Indonesian government or society.

Assisting, Adapting, Accomplishing

While there were many difficulties faced by Australian youth living in Indonesia highlighted in this article, there has also been some positive learnings during the pandemic.

In Part One of this series, it was revealed that Indonesian youth in Australia had heard of multiple instances of racism against foreigners. However, all of our Australian youth in Indonesia respondents disclosed that they had neither experienced any racism first-hand related to the pandemic, nor heard of any other foreigners experiencing it.

Additionally, Sophie commented on the extensive community-support present in Indonesia. “This pandemic has been the first time I have experienced first-hand the community systems in Indonesia and the way friends and neighbours step up to help one another in times of need. I really admire this and I don’t think we do it to the same extent in Australia”.

Samuel noted that both he and others in his network were able to retain their jobs with regular incomes throughout the pandemic, with many workplaces adapting to working from home. He said that this “seemed to be very different from back in Australia, where it seemed everyone he knew were losing their employment”.

Hannah pointed out the resilience of the Indonesian people – “the pandemic highlighted how resilient Indonesian society is, and how infinitely adaptable people are here – finding ways to survive in the most difficult of circumstances”.

Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the resilience of people and governments globally, and despite the challenges faced by these interviewees, young Australians continue to persist in making a life abroad. With the Omicron variant still raging globally and the possibility of other variants emerging, the perspectives of youth in both Indonesia and Australia are crucial in reflecting on the pandemic’s impact, and ways forward.

*Note: All names used in this article have been pseudonymised to protect the anonymity of interviewees. 

Written by Kate Langley. Editing by Hirzi Laksana, Gillian Scott, Jaya Pastor-Elsegood and Audrey Prasetya.

In February 2020, a month before Indonesia recorded its first COVID case, Indonesian President Joko Widodo ‘Jokowi’ spoke to Australia’s parliament in Canberra, calling Australia Indonesia’s ‘closest friend’, who ‘never leaves Indonesia’s side during times of disaster’. But how true does this statement remain at the height of Indonesia’s COVID crisis? How has the pandemic affected the major pillars of our bilateral relationship? In this article, we’ll be examining the effects of the pandemic on the Australia-Indonesia trade relationship by looking at case studies of three sectors: education, tourism and aid. 

International Education

Prior to the pandemic, Indonesia was a significant and fast-growing market for Australia’s international education sector, with Indonesian international students contributing a billion dollars to the Australian economy in 2019. Enrolments also reached a peak in 2020, when 17,969 Indonesians studied at an Australian institution – an increase of 7% from the previous year. Indeed, Australia is the number one destination for Indonesian students looking to study abroad.

However, with the advent of border restrictions introduced in March 2020, international students were no longer allowed to enter Australia and the subsequent impact on the international education sector was immense. Focusing on Indonesian students in particular, total enrolments fell by a whopping 14% between 2020 and 2021. There is also anecdotal evidence that students are choosing alternative destinations such as the US and the UK for their study due to the unappealing nature of online learning.

Australian students have similarly been affected by pandemic-related border restrictions. In 2018, Indonesia was the number one destination for New Colombo Plan (NCP) Mobility Projects, a government-scheme aimed at boosting Asia-Pacific awareness through international study opportunities. However, the ban on outbound travel has stripped Australian university students of their exchange and study abroad opportunities, with the NCP and schemes such as the Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies grinding to a near halt (excluding virtual offerings).

Despite this, positive developments have also been borne out of the pandemic. In November 2020, Monash University was granted a licence to establish a physical campus in Jakarta – a first for a foreign university in Indonesia This was enabled by the Indonesia Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement which deregulated Indonesia’s university sector for Australian investors. With Monash Indonesia planning to open its campus to students in October 2021, some optimism towards Australia and Indonesia’s trade relationship in the area of international education, can perhaps be justified.

Tourism

The COVID pandemic negatively impacted the tourism industry globally and Indonesia is no exception. Foreign arrivals dropped 75% from 16.11 million in 2019 to 4.02 million in 2020. This figure is predicted to drop further in 2021 as the government has mandated an 5-day quarantine on everyone arriving in Indonesia effective July 6th 2021. 

Prior to 2020, Indonesia could expect over 1 million visits from Australia annually. On average, Australian tourists have the inclination to spend more money per day and stay longer than any other nationality. In 2014, it is estimated that Australian tourists alone contributed $1.8 billion AUD to the Indonesian economy. However the number of Australian visits have dropped significantly as of 2020, with only approximately 260 000 Australian arrivals.This drop is due to Australia’s strict enforcement of their border control during the pandemic, not allowing citizens and permanent residents to leave Australia to engage in international tourism. 

As a result of the lack of tourists, tourism hotspots like Bali have been economically devastated. A small survey conducted by kopernik.info found that the pandemic impacted 81% of the 77 household respondents’ incomes, 44% of which have either permanently or temporarily lost their jobs. Overall the survey concluded that there is a 61% decrease in the respondents’ incomes. 

Mutual Aid and Assistance

A core pillar of our bilateral relationship pre-pandemic has been based on mutual aid and assistance. In 2020, Indonesia answered Australia’s call for help during the bushfires, sending over military personnel. The billion-dollar aid package from the Howard Government after Indonesia’s 2005 Tsunami remains strong in the mind of Indonesians, and is a shining example of the commitment Australia has shown to its important strategic partnership. At 3.49 million cases and 98,889 deaths at the time of writing, Indonesia now has the highest number of fatalities and infections of COVID in South-East Asia, and demand for medical care and supplies has overwhelmed its health system. 

The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Marise Payne that Australia will donate $12 million in support and 2.5 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine is a promising start. However, the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong claims that this amount ‘pales in comparison to other nations’ [contributions]’. With AstraZeneca rollouts recently delayed, Indonesia is struggling, and this presents an opportunity for Australia to further assist through aid contributions for vaccine procurement, demonstrating Australia’s prioritisation of Indonesia as a regional partner. Without a strong aid commitment from Australia, other countries have begun to fill the gaps in Indonesia’s COVID response and support. Thus far China has provided Indonesia with many vaccines, collaborated in clinical trials and manufacturing, and in June pledged further closer cooperation in their COVID response after a high-level meeting in Guiyang. With Indonesia’s current vaccination rate at only 7.56%, there is still much that can be done to assist. 

Conclusion

The COVID pandemic has created many challenges, and the Australia-Indonesia relationship has not escaped unscathed, with numerous downturns in trade and aid, people-to-people interactions and key areas of investment such as education and tourism affected. In spite of this, there remains numerous opportunities for areas of closer cooperation and growth, both currently during the COVID crisis and post-pandemic. The Indonesian and Australian Governments made significant strides before COVID through new trade agreements such as the IA-CEPA, education initiatives and cross-cultural exchanges, and can hopefully continue to make good use of these in the future despite pandemic setbacks. However, if Australia wants to preserve and strengthen one of their most important neighbourly and strategic regional relationships, they should also commit more in financial assistance and aid support. It is no surprise that the greatest area of need at this time is for Indonesia’s vaccination program in addition to the amounts already pledged. Increasing aid now will only serve to strengthen the bilateral trade relationship in the future.

Written by Ghaby Gunawan, Hirzi Putra Laksana and Kate Langley